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INTRODUCTION 
The evidence presented at trial does not support the verdict because the evidence 
establishes that plaintiffs benign positional paroxysmal vertigo ("BPPV"), the primary 
symptom of which is dizziness, pre-existed the accident. Plaintiff was diagnosed with vertigo 
and suffered from the same symptoms, as early as 1996. Once a person has BPPV, the 
condition is not curable and the fall could not have caused plaintiffs BPPV. 
In addition, plaintiffs expert, a sports medicine physician, failed to offer a report 
containing a conclusion regarding the cause of plaintiff s BPPV. He also lacked any 
knowledge, skill, education, experience or qualifications in inner ear problems such as BPPV. 
Plaintiffs expert therefore should not have been permitted to testify regarding the cause of 
plaintiffs BPPV. Moreover, the trial court erred when it allowed plaintiffs treating physician 
to testify as to the cause of plaintiffs BPPV. 
With respect to damages, plaintiff presented no quantitative evidence of damages. 
The only testimony presented at trial regarding damages was that plaintiffs treatment was 
reasonable and that future treatment would be similar to past treatment. No evidence of the 
cost, duration, frequency or type of treatment was ever admitted. Although counsel now 
refer to a Summary of Medical Expenses, that proposed exhibit was never presented to the 
jury, was subject to Schindler's objection under Rule 1006 and did not support plaintiffs 
damage argument in closing and was, in fact, inconsistent with that argument. 
Finally, plaintiffs counsel's opening and closing statements were so riddled with 
improper and prejudicial comments regarding Schindler, Schindler's counsel and plaintiff, the 
jury verdict could only have been rendered as a result of passion and prejudice. 
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I. RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff argues that it was improper for Schindler to examine the plaintiff concerning 
her medical history and that in doing so Schindler invited plaintiffs counsel's objectionable 
"testimony" as to her credibility and, also, counsel's attacks on Schindler and its counsel. 
Brief of Appellee at 2-3. In fact plaintiff states: 
Schindler should not be allowed to call into question the credibility and 
personal veracity of [plaintiff], and then claim reversible error when they find 
the testimony and rebuttal argument made by counsel unpalatable. 
Brief of Appellee at 3 (emphasis added). 
First, assuming Schindler attacked plaintiffs credibility, plaintiffs counsel's admitted 
"testimony" as to plaintiffs character is not evidence supporting her credibility. Counsel's 
repeated testimony in closing as to his personal opinion of plaintiff, as opposed to arguing 
evidence of her credibility, was improper. Second, attacks unsupported by any evidence 
against Schindler and its counsel certainly do nothing to support plaintiffs credibility. 
Third, it is absurd to argue, as plaintiff does, that it is an "attack [on] the credibility 
and personal veracity" to examine the plaintiff concerning her medical history. The entirely 
proper purpose of the examination of plaintiffs medical history and records at trial was to 
show that the injuries complained of pre-existed the accident. Plaintiff does not and cannot 
point to a single instance in examination or argument where Schindler made any improper 
personal "attack" against her. This attempt to justify plaintiffs counsel's improper 
"testimony" and attacks on Schindler and its counsel is unavailing and should be disregarded 
by this Court 
Finally, plaintiff asserts that she "submitted" her past and future medical expenses to 
? 
the jury. Plaintiff fails to acknowledge that she submitted neither documents nor testimony 
to establish the amount of any medical treatment in this case. The only document which 
plaintiff argues contains information regarding damages based on medical costs is plaintiffs 
"Summary of Medical Expenses" which was never presented to the jury. Schindler 
specifically objected to that Summary exhibit both before and at trial because no supporting 
documentation was ever provided under URE 1006, and, indeed, the summary was not 
supported by the medical records placed in evidence by Schindler. Even that Summary does 
not support the damages argued by counsel at closing. Indeed, counsel argued at closing for 
future medical expenses based on treatment and medications that appeared nowhere in 
plaintiffs own Summary exhibit and for which there was no evidentiary support whatsoever. 
A. Response To Plaintiffs Statement Of Facts Relevant To The Issues 
Presented For Review. 
1. Facts at Issue. 
Plaintiffs statement of the facts ignores the uncontroverted medical history and 
medical records documenting the incident in question. For example, plaintiff asserts that she 
spent "several hours in the emergency room" suffering from, in counsel's words, "anxiety, 
nausea, respiratory distress, and fainting." Brief of Appellee at 6. The emergency room 
record tells a different story. Plaintiff arrived at the emergency room at approximately 2:14. 
See Ex. 42. Plaintiff had no complaints and suffered from no pain, injury, or trauma. See id. 
Plaintiffs EKG and vital signs were normal and she was released at approximately 3:45, 
approximately 90 minutes after she was admitted. See id. 
Plaintiff correctly asserts that the Dix-Hallpike maneuver is the primary test to 
diagnose BPPV. Plaintiff then correctly states that "[a] positive Dix-Halpike causes 
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nystagmus in the patient's eyes." Brief of Appellee at 8. Plaintiff then, however, erroneously 
contends that the March 2002 medical record showed that no nystagmus resulted from 
plaintiffs treatment on that date. Id. In fact, that record reflects that the Dix-Hallpike 
indicated positive for lose canaliths, (canaliths are calcium carbonate crystals normally 
attached atop a membrane in of the inner ear) that the doctors "IMPRESSIONS" state 
"Postural vertigo-but not clear cut BPPV" and plaintiff was sent for Canalith Repositioning 
Treatment ("CRT") that same day. Def. Ex. 30a. That CRT, which involves the same type 
of maneuvering of the head as the Dix-Hallpike maneuver, did produce nystagmus: 
"Performed CRT on left side and provoked diz2iness and nystagmus." Id; R. 910 p. 456 (Dr. 
Siddoway's testimony re similarity of CRT and Dix-Hallpike.) 
Plaintiff then incorrectly argues that Schindler relied solely on that 2002 record as 
evidence that plaintiffs BPPV pre-dated the accident, failing to acknowledge plaintiffs 1996 
medical record, where plaintiff was diagnosed with vertigo, including nystagmus. Def. Ex. 
118. While Dr. Siddoway testified that the 2002 episode was different than the BPPV 
suffered by plaintiff after the fall, he also testified that, based on the 1996 record, plaintiff 
suffered from vertigo in 1996. R. 910 p. 460-61. He also referenced the 1996 episode in his 
record of March 2002. Defendant's Exhibit Binder tab 30a. Prior to trial, plaintiff did not 
produce the 1996 record establishing that she suffered from vertigo with the same 
BPPV symptoms as after the fall. At trial and now on appeal, plaintiff continues to ignore 
the record that definitively establishes that she suffered from BPPV as early as 1996, 
establishing that the 2004 accident could not have caused that condition. 
Plaintiff asserts that her medical providers determined that as a result of the fall, the 
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canaliths1 in her inner ear broke loose, causing her to suffer from BPPV. To the contrary, 
none of plaintiffs medical providers opined that the 2004 fall was the cause or onset of 
plaintiffs BPPV. The medical records, however, irrefutably demonstrate that as early as 
1996, plaintiff was diagnosed with vertigo and suffered from the exact same BPPV symptoms 
that she suffered from after the fall. Defendant's Exhibit Binder tab 118. Plaintiff asserts 
that BPPV can only be caused from trauma and that since the only evidence of trauma was 
the fall, the BPPV must have been caused by the fall. Appellee's Brief at. 7. Plaintiffs own 
treating physician, however, testified that trauma is only one of several possible causes of 
BPPV. R. 910 at 425. Because plaintiff suffered from BPPV as early as 1996, the fall in 2004 
was not the cause of the condition. While plaintiff admits that she experienced different 
types of dizziness before the fall, she fails to acknowledge that as early as 1996 she 
experienced the identical BPPV symptoms that she claimed were caused by the accident. 
Appellee's Brief at 7. 
Plaintiff asserts that Schindler refuses to acknowledge that plaintiffs dizziness before 
the accident was different than the dizziness that she experience afterwards. Schindler did 
not and has not insisted that all of plaintiff s prior instances of dizziness were necessarily 
BPPV-related. Schindler simply presented plaintiffs medical background to the jury so the 
jirry had a complete picture of her medical history. Plaintiff, on the other hand, did not rely 
on or even discuss any of plaintiffs medical history prior to the accident 
2. Schindler's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Schindler's primary argument was that plaintiff 
1
 Plaintiff refers to the crystal in the inner ear as "candaliths." The proper term is canaliths. 
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could not establish causation of her alleged injuries, specifically her BPPV, because no expert 
had opined, or could opine, as to the cause of that condition. To be clear, Schindler does not 
rely, as plaintiff asserts, on the fact that plaintiffs expert report failed use the word causation. 
Rather, Schindler focused on the fact that plaintiffs expert's report contained neither an 
opinion nor any basis regarding the cause of plaintiffs BPPV. Even if he had, plaintiffs 
expert had no qualifications whatsoever to render such an opinion. 
Plaintiff and the trial court inexplicably concluded that because plaintiffs expert 
report stated: "Benign Positional vertigo [BPV] as related to the elevator incident" (emphasis 
added), the report contained an expert opinion as to the cause of plaintiffs BPPV. That 
conclusion certainly begs the question as to what might be the basis for such an opinion, if it 
was intended as such, and in fact the report contains no indication that Dr. Morgan had any 
opinion as to the cause of that condition. Indeed, although no opinion as to causation 
appears in his report, in his deposition Dr. Morgan candidly admitted he relied solely on Dr. 
Siddoway's records and the absence of any history of dizziness (which itself is incorrect, 
for the reasons discussed above) to conclude plaintiff even had BPPV as a result of the fall. 
R. 396-400. Finally, plaintiffs argument that Dr. Morgan's report assigns a 4% disability 
rating from BPPV "related to the elevator incident," is simply a conclusion as to disability 
which assumes causation, not an opinion establishing causation. Brief of Appellee at 10; 
Morgan Report R. 0210. 
3. Plaintiffs Affidavit. 
Plaintiff offers no legal basis to refute Schindler's argument that a lay person may not 
opine as to the cause of a medical condition. Plaintiff simply cites to the trial court's 
erroneous ruling that plaintiffs affidavit was proper as to the facts surrounding her claim, 
something Schindler did not dispute. As explained in Schindler's opening brief, while 
plaintiff may testify as to facts surrounding her symptoms, causation cannot be established by 
her own testimony but must be established by expert medical testimony. 
4. Dr. Morgan's Testimony. 
Plaintiff asserts that Schindler offered no testimony to refute Dr. Morgan's 
conclusions regarding plaintiffs BPPV. Schindler had no such obligation. The burden of 
proof is on plaintiff to prove her claims, not on Schindler to disprove them. The 
fundamental problem is that Dr. Morgan has no knowledge, education, experience, skill or 
expertise sufficient to allow him to opine regarding BPPV. While he may be "highly 
competent" in performing independent medical evaluations, his competence does not extend 
to the condition of BPPV, a condition he has never evaluated and for which he knows 
neither the causes nor the standard diagnostic test. R. 910 p. 402-03, 408. It is simply not 
possible to testify with expertise that a condition was caused by an event while admitting, as 
Dr. Morgan did, that you do not know the possible causes of the condition. In fact, the court 
acknowledged: 
Quite frankly, I thought both experts left a little bit to be desired. I think 
they're both outside their fields . . . . 
R. 911 p. 577 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff argues that Schindler's "campaign" against Dr. Morgan is based on 
Schindler's lack of evidence to support its position. Brief of Appellee at 13. Although 
plaintiff is wrong and fails to mention that plaintiffs own treating physician acknowledged 
that as early as 1996 plaintiff suffered from vertigo with the same symptoms as those she 
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suffered from after the fall, that fact has nothing to do with Dr. Morgan's lack of expertise as 
to Def. Ex. 118. Dr. Morgan is a sports medicine doctor who admittedly has never 
diagnosed BPPV, does not know the causes of BPPV, does not know the standard diagnostic 
test for BPPV and could not determine either the presence or cause of plaintiff s BPPV. R. 
396-400; 910 pp. 402-03, 408 and 410. That lack of expertise should have precluded his 
testimony. 
5. Plaintiffs Special Damages. 
Plaintiffs Summary of Past Medical Expenses ("Summary") was not shown to a single 
witness or the jury and plaintiff did not attempt to admit it into evidence until after the close 
of plaintiffs case. Plaintiffs representation that the Summary was testified to by three 
medical experts is not true. In fact, not one of those witnesses was shown or testified to that 
Summary at trial. 
Plaintiff first asserts Dr. Morgan's testimony supports her special damages. Dr. 
Morgan vaguely listed certain medical records in his report and agreed, in his testimony, that 
he had reviewed those unspecified and incomplete records and that in his opinion, plaintiffs 
unspecified treatment and the unspecified cost of that treatment, were "reasonable and 
necessary." Brief of Appellee p. 13. Plaintiff mischaracterizes Dr. Morgan's testimony. 
Plaintiffs Summary was not referred to or discussed during Dr. Morgan's trial testimony or at 
any other time during trial. Rather, Dr. Morgan's testimony regarding costs was simply that 
plaintiffs treatment and costs were reasonable from a community standard, but neither the 
dollar cost or specific treatment provided were discussed and the records he reviewed, in 
addition to being incomplete, were never admitted into evidence or disclosed to the jury. R. 
ft 
910 at 383-84. Dr. Morgan answering yes to plaintiffs general question about the 
reasonableness of plaintiffs unspecified costs for unspecified treatment does not establish the 
amount of plaintiff s special damages.2 
Plaintiff similarly claims that Dr. Amann established plaintiffs damages related to her 
neck and rib treatment and that Dr. Siddoway established costs for treatment related to 
BPPV. Brief of Appellee at 13-14. Their testimony, however, did not include any reference 
to any cost of any treatment and did not include any reference to any exhibit or summary. R. 
909 pp. 186-88; R. 910 pp. 447-48. Those treating doctors' general statements of opinion 
concerning the reasonableness of unspecified treatment, without reference to the cost of that 
treatment, do not support an award of special damages. 
In a futile attempt to salvage her damage claim, plaintiff asserts that damages were 
established and that no evidence of damages was necessary, because Schindler had 
information regarding damages prior to trial. See id, at 14-15. Of course, the fact that 
plaintiff provided medical records in discovery or that Schindler prepared summaries based 
on plaintiffs medical records, does not relieve plaintiff of her burden to establish past and 
future special damages by presenting evidence of them at trial. 
2
 Plaintiff insists that the Summary was admitted into evidence. In fact, the court ruled 
incorrectly in response to Schindler's Motion for Directed Verdict that it understood that 
Schindler waived objection to the Summary of Past Medical Expenses. However, Schindler's 
pretrial objection is clear that never happened. R. 911 pp. 576-77; R. R. 482-83. The court 
also noted erroneously that Schindler did not object to the Summary being admitted into 
evidence prior to closing. R. 911 p. 576. In fact, Schindler had already objected to the 
Summary and did not object again to admission of the Summary prior to closing because 
plaintiffs counsel did not once refer to the Summary at any time during trial. Other than 
Schindler's pre-trial objection (R. 482-83) and motion for directed verdict, the Summary was 
not mentioned during the examination of any witness or referred to at trial until plaintiffs 
counsel purported to use it as the basis for a new summary he wrote during closing, at which 
time Schindler renewed its objection. R. 911 p. 660. 
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6. Instruction Regarding Pre-Existing Injury. 
Although the evidence at trial established that plaintiffs BPPV was a pre-existing 
condition, and that the only possible recovery plaintiff could argue would have been for 
exacerbation of a pre-existing injury, plaintiff refused to admit her condition was pre-existing 
and never raised a claim for exacerbation of that condition. It was therefore error for the 
court to instruct the jury on an unasserted claim of exacerbation of a pre-existing condition. 
7. Opening and Closing Arguments. 
In response to Schindler's assertion regarding plaintiffs counsel's inappropriate 
remarks during opening and closing arguments, plaintiff attempts to argue that Schindler's 
counsel also acted inappropriately during trial. No inappropriate comments or behavior were 
ever objected to at trial by plaintiffs counsel and, not surprisingly, plaintiff does not cite to 
any instance of Schindler's counsel's alleged "bullying" of witnesses at trial. It was plaintiffs 
counsel's statements that resulted in an admonishment from the judge, not Schindler's.3 
Plaintiff asserts that it was proper for counsel to provide a "demonstration" to the 
jury as to how to calculate future damages based on life expectancy. Plaintiff should not have 
been permitted to reference anything regarding life expectancy in closing since no evidence to 
that effect was offered at trial. See, Schindler's Brief at 44-45. 
Without evidence of life expectancy, an award of future damages is not proper. 
Although plaintiff asserts incorrecdy that Schindler did not object to the comments regarding 
3
 The number of Schindler's objections at trial are not, as asserted by plaintiff, a poor 
reflection on Schindler (most of the objections were sustained or warranted discussion from 
the judge and counsel). Rather, Schindler's objections resulted from plaintiffs counsel's 
continual errors at trial requiring objection and ruling in order for Schindler to preserve its 
record for appeal. 
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life expectancy at trial, Schindler raised the objection to that issue on more than one occasion 
and the trial court, initially and correctly, argued that future damages could not be awarded 
absent evidence of life expectancy. R. 911, 584-85. 
Finally, plaintiff asserts that because her counsel "took it back" after informing the 
jury that Schindler had a "legal obligation to bring in a doctor to say Dr. Siddoway is wrong 
and he didn't" that error was somehow harmless. R. 911 p. 709. Schindler maintains that 
this statement, along with the plethora of other insulting, improper and inappropriate 
remarks by plaintiffs counsel, nevertheless constitutes error. 
ARGUMENT 
I. CAUSATION 
A. Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Misreading Orris v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2 ^ 15, 177 P.3d 600, plaintiff asserts that the 
Court properly denied Schindler's Motion for Summary Judgment because Schindler argued 
only a lack of evidence to support plaintiffs case. Plaintiff made no such argument below 
and the court made no such ruling in denying Schindler's motion. 
In Orris, the Court established the respective burdens on summary judgment where 
the moving party filed a motion on a claim on which the non-moving party had the burden: 
A summary judgment movant, on an issue where the non-moving party will 
bear the burden of proof at trial, may satisfy its burden on summary judgment 
by showing, by reference to 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any/ that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact. Upon such a showing, whether or not 
supported by additional affirmative factual evidence, the burden then shifts to 
the nonmoring party, who 'may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
the pleadings/ but cmust set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial/ 
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Id. at TJ18 (citations omitted) (emphasis original). 
Schindler's argument regarding causation focused not on alternative causes of 
plaintiffs BPPV but rather on the legal requirement that a plaintiff establish causation 
through expert testimony. Schindler met its burden by demonstrating from the deposition 
and expert report of plaintiffs expert that plaintiff could not establish causation. The burden 
then shifted to plaintiff to prove that she could establish causation through the required 
expert testimony. Plaintiff did not meet that burden. R 0237-38. 
Summary judgment is proper where, as here, plaintiff has no evidence that the alleged 
injuries were caused by the defendant. Triesault v. Imagination Theaters, Inc., 2005 UT App 489 
1f 16; Beard v. K. -Mart Corp., 200 UT App 285, ffif 12, 16. In this case, Plaintiff was required to 
establish causation through expert testimony. Beard v. K.-Mart Corp., 200 UT App 285, U 11. 
Although plaintiffs affidavit set forth her opinion as to the cause of her injuries, that 
testimony alone cannot establish causation because plaintiff is not an expert Id. 
Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Morgan's report established causation because it contained 
the words "related to" when referring to BPPV. Brief of Appellee at 25. That statement 
simply presumes causation and provides neither an opinion as to causation nor any basis for 
such an opinion. Although no "magic words" are necessary to establish causation, plaintiffs 
reliance on Red/and Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep't. of Army, 55 F.3d 827, 852 (3rd Cir. 1995) is 
misplaced. In Red/and, while the court stated that medical experts are not required to use 
certain words to show causation, testimony must establish causation "to a reasonable degree 
of certainty." Id. at 852. As explained by one court: 
It is not necessary for an expert to state an opinion regarding causation with 
the 'magic' words reasonable degree of medical certainty or probability, . . . an 
1? 
expert opinion is to be judged in view of the entirety of the expert's opinion. . . 
. A physician's opinion must be sufficientiy definite and certain that there is a 
clear connection between the injury and the [alleged negligence]. 
Flock v. "Pepsi Cola Co., 1996 Neb. App. LEXIS 227 No. A-96-071 (November 5, 1996 
Nebraska Ct. App.)4 "When the element of causation involves a complex medical question, 
as a matter of law, no rational juror can find that a plaintiff has established causation unless 
the plaintiff has presented expert testimony that there is a reasonable probability that the 
alleged negligence caused the plaintiffs injuries." Hudjohn v. S&G Machinery Co., 114 P.3d 
1141, 1148 (Ore. Ct. App. 2005). Viewing Dr. Morgan's report in its entirety, it provides 
neither an opinion as to the cause of plaintiffs BPPV nor any basis for such an opinion. 
Plaintiff also asserts that causation can be inferred from Dr. Morgan's report. Brief of 
Appellee at 27. First, Dr. Morgan's expert report is required to disclose both his opinions 
and the basis for his opinions. URCP 26(a)(3). It does not. Second, such an inference, even 
if it could be made from the words "related to" in Dr. Morgan's report, is not sufficient to 
establish causation to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Dr. Morgan testified that his 
conclusion that the BPPV was related to the fall was based on his incorrect conclusion that 
plaintiff had not suffered from di2ziness before the fall. R. 396-400. In essence, Dr. 
Morgan's conclusion was that because BPPV symptoms occurred after the fall, the fall must 
4
 See also State Office of Risk Management v. Larkins, 258 S.W.3d 686, 692 (Tx. Ct. App. 10th Cir. 
2008)("In the medical context, expert testimony that is not based on reasonable medical 
probability, but relies instead on possibility, speculation, or surmise, does not assist the jury 
and cannot support a judgment"); Bara v. Clarksville Memorial Health Systems, Inc., 104 S.W.3d 1, 
9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)("[P]roof of causation equating to a 'possibility,' a 'might have,' ccould 
have,' is not sufficient, as a matter of law to establish the required nexus between the 
plaintiffs injury and the defendant's tortious conduct by a preponderance of the evidence . . . 
Causation . . . is a matter of probability, not possibility and . . . must be shown to a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty."). 
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have caused the BPPV. Even if it were true (which it is not) that plaintiff suffered from no 
dizziness before the fall, Dr. Morgan's temporal link between the fall and BPPV is not 
sufficient to establish causation to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Indeed, Courts 
have routinely rejected medical opinions which infer causation from nothing more than the 
temporal relationship between the alleged negligence and the claimed injury. See McCollin v. 
Danek Medical, Inc., 50 F. Supp.2d 1119, 1128 (D. Utah 1999).5 
B. Motion In Limine and Motion For Directed Verdict Based On Lack Of 
Evidence Of Causation. 
Schindler asserts that, first, its Motion in Limine and, second, its Motion for Directed 
Verdict, should have been granted due to plaintiffs lack of evidence of causation. Relying on 
Evans v. Eangston, 2007 UT App 240 |^ 6,166 P.3d 621, plaintiff asserts that the trial court 
properly allowed Dr. Morgan to testify as plaintiffs expert at trial. While trial courts have 
discretion to determine the competency of an expert witness, experts must be qualified and 
their testimony must meet the threshold of being useful to the trier of fact in order to be 
admissible. See id. at 624. At trial, however, the court actually recogni2ed Dr. Morgan's lack 
of expertise, although he had allowed his testimony over Schindler's objection, stating: 
Quite frankly, I thought both experts left a little bit to be desired. I think 
they're both outside their fields . . . . 
R. 911 p. 577.6 
Evans actually supports Schindler's argument that an expert must testify in his own 
5
 With respect to the issue of the admissibility of plaintiffs affidavit, even if plaintiffs 
statements in her affidavit regarding her medical conditions were admissible, such testimony 
is not sufficient to establish causation which, as set forth above, must be established through 
expert medical testimony. 
6
 Plaintiff did not object to Schindler's expert's qualifications. 
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field of practice. See id. Dr. Morgan was "outside [his] field" in this case. Dr. Morgan has 
never testified regarding BPPV, has no training, education, skill or knowledge regarding 
BPPV and did nothing he considered research in connection with this case. R. 910 pp. 402-
03, 408, 410. Dr. Morgan does not know the causes of BPPV and does not know the 
standard test used to diagnose that condition. See id. Dr. Morgan could not and did not offer 
any useful information to assist the trier of fact regarding plaintiffs BPPV. 
Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Morgan was properly allowed to testify regarding causation 
because in his deposition he stated that he relied on Dr. Siddoway's diagnosis of plaintiffs 
BPPV and opined that the BPPV was caused by the fall because plaintiff had no history of 
dizziness before the fall so the BPPV must have been caused by the fall. Brief of Appellee at 
31; R. 396-400. As explained above, that is not admissible expert testimony. As also 
discussed above, Dr. Morgan's report contained no opinion regarding causation and no basis 
for such an opinion. The fact that Schindler was aware of those defects in Dr. Morgan's 
report does not in any way qualify Dr. Morgan to testify. 
Plaintiff cites to Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah 1974), in support of her 
argument that Dr. Morgan could rely on the records of other medical providers in his report. 
That case has no application here. Lamb involved an agreement for the sale of livestock and 
the health of the livestock being sold. See id. at 606. It involved claims for breach of 
warranty and fraud. See id, at 603. There was no negligence claim or question of causation at 
issue in that case. In that case the Court held that an expert in a case based on a contract may 
rely on relevant documents in reaching his opinion. See id, at 607-08. The Court did not 
hold, as plaintiff suggests, that a medical doctor offering an expert medical opinion may rely 
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solely on another physician's records and diagnosis in reaching his conclusions. 
Plaintiffs citation to the Federal Advisory Committee Notes is similarly unavailing. 
Brief of Appellee at 33. The Notes suggest that a physician in a certain area of practice may 
rely on statements from other doctors in that same practice area in reaching his expert 
opinions. The Notes do not suggest that a doctor with no knowledge, training, education, 
expertise, skill or experience in a certain area may opine in that area based solely on another 
physician's records. 
Plaintiff also argues that causation is Dr. Morgan's specialty. Brief of Appellee at 33. 
To suggest that Dr. Morgan can testify to the cause of any medical condition is without basis, 
particularly here where he testified he did not know the causes of the condition or the test to 
determine its presence. There is also no merit in plaintiffs argument that a cursory review of 
a few internet articles, not listed in his report (although he testified that everything he had 
reviewed was listed in his report) is sufficient for Dr. Morgan to be qualified as an expert in a 
field of medicine he has never worked in or studied. R. 910 pp 409-10. In fact, Dr. Morgan 
testified his reading was insignificant and did not qualify as "research." Id. p. 409. 
Plaintiff relies on Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 935 F2d 1090, 1101 (10th Or. 1991), for the 
proposition that a physician who is not a specialist may testify as an expert. Brief of Appellee 
at 34. Again, that case has no application here. In Wheeler, the court held that a psychiatrist, 
although not a specialist in cognitive psychology, could testify regarding "momentary 
forgetfulness" and that his lack of specialty went to the weight, not the admissibility of the 
evidence. Id. at 1101. Unlike Wheeler, this is not a case where Dr. Morgan is an Ear Nose and 
Throat physician (the type of physician that treats conditions such as dizziness and vertigo) 
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but has no specialty in BPPV. Rather, Dr. Morgan is not an ENT at all. Dr. Morgan's 
specialty is the entirely unrelated area of sports medicine and physical rehabilitation. 
Plaintiffs reliance on Holrook v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 80 F.3d 777, 782 (3rd Cir. 
1996), is similarly misplaced. In Ho/brook, the plaintiff alleged that he suffered from 
mesothelioma, a form of lung cancer, caused from exposure to asbestos. Id. at 780. 
Plaintiffs treating physician and an expert who was a board certified physician in internal and 
pulmonary medicine testified for the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiffs treating physician: 
described the medical procedures undertaken to diagnose and treat [plaintiff]. 
In great detail, he described the treatment, including his injection of the 
chemotherapeutic agent fluorouracil into his patient's chest cavity. 
Id. at 781. Plaintiffs other expert's practice: 
involve[d] medical treatment, certain procedures such as looking into the lungs 
of patients. It involves an expertise in reading chest x-rays and understanding 
pulmonary function tests which are breathing tests. It involves treatment of 
occupational diseases that affect the chest. 
Id. Mesothelioma is a pulmonary disease. On those facts, the appellate court reversed the 
trial court's exclusion of plaintiffs expert testimony, stating that the trial court is not to 
exclude expert testimony simply because it may not be the "best." Id. at 782. Rather, as long 
an expert has, pursuant to Rule 702, the necessary "knowledge skill, experience, training or 
education," in a certain area such as lung function and disease, that person qualifies as an 
expert. Dr. Morgan's skill, knowledge, training, education and experience solely in the area of 
sports medicine and physical rehabilitation, does not qualify him, under even the most 
minimal requirements, to testify as an expert regarding a condition of the inner ear. Finally, 
in Pao/iKK Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829, 856 (3fd Cir. 1990), the expert testimony in 
question was found admissible because each of the experts, unlike Dr. Morgan, were highly 
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educated, qualified and experienced in the scientific field that was the subject matter of the 
case. See id. at 856. 
Dr. Morgan simply has no qualifications at all to testify as an expert regarding BPPV.7 
II. MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON DAMAGES 
Contrary to plaintiffs argument, Schindler did marshall all of the evidence at trial 
regarding damages. The totality of that evidence, however, was that plaintiffs treatment was 
reasonable and necessary and that future treatment would be similar to past treatment. Those 
statements are the ONLY evidence that arguably supports plaintiffs claim for damages. 
Conspicuously absent is any evidence with regard to the cost of the past or future treatment. 
Plaintiff vaguely refers to a "summary of medical expenses" in several contexts. It is 
important to differentiate between the Summary of Past Medical Expenses, marked as 
Exhibit 117 but not admitted into evidence, and the arguments of counsel at closing 
purportedly summarizing plaintiffs past and future damages. As discussed at length at pages 
42 to 45 of Schindler's Brief, and tellingly not addressed in plaintiffs brief, the arguments of 
plaintiffs counsel are not supported by the Summary of Past Medical Expenses. Indeed, 
those arguments are not even arguably supported by any evidence. 
7
 In its opening brief, Schindler argued that plaintiffs treating physicians were improperly 
allowed to testify as experts at trial concerning the cause of plaintiffs injuries and the 
reasonableness of her treatment by other doctors. Those doctors were allowed to testify as 
to matters outside their role as treating physicians even though they were not identified as 
testifying experts. In fact, even though one treating physician reviewed the records of other 
doctors only at the request of plaintiffs counsel, and not in connection with plaintiffs 
treatment, he was allowed to testify to the reasonableness of that care. R. 909 p. 183. Finally, 
the trial court, having allowed the treating physicians to testify as to causation based on a 
ruling that their testimony could not establish legal causation which had to be proved through 
Dr. Morgan, failed to instruct the jury as to that limitation. Plaintiff did not address any of 
these arguments. 
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Instead, plaintiff relies solely on an eighty (80) year old Virginia state court decision in 
arguing that Schindler should be found to have waived any objection to plaintiffs argument 
for damages because Schindler argued from its own summary submitted in rebuttal to 
plaintiffs summary. Brief of Appellee at 38. Specifically, plaintiff argues that a party waives 
its right to object to evidence when the objecting party itself presents evidence of the same 
character. See id. That rule has no application here. 
First, Schindler offered no evidence regarding plaintiffs medical expenses. Rather, 
Schindler made rebuttal argument in closing in response to plaintiffs arguments in closing to 
which Schindler objected. No written summary used by either counsel at closing was 
admitted into evidence. Second, even assuming this Court was bound the obscure rule of a 
Virginia state court almost eighty years ago, and even if the rule was applicable here, it does 
not apply in the context of plaintiff s failure to present any evidence of damages at trial. The 
rule is narrow and applies only to objections made to evidence presented by a party, not cross-
examination or rebuttal argument. See Pettus v. Gottfried, 606 S.W.2d 819, 825-26 (Va. 1998). 
Plaintiff also states that Schindler improperly relies on Price-Orem v. Kollinsy 784 P.2d 
475 (Utah 1989), in support of its argument that plaintiff failed to present evidence regarding 
damages. Brief of Appellee at 38. Plaintiff states that much less evidence of damages existed 
in Price-Orem than this case. See id. In this case, plaintiff presented N O quantitative evidence 
of damages. Despite plaintiffs repeated attempts to characterize Exhibit 117 as evidence, 
that information was never introduced, discussed, testified to, or in any way even mentioned 
during the course of the trial until closing arguments. Plaintiff cites to no legal authority, and 
indeed there is none, which allows a plaintiff to prove damages without any evidence of 
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damages introduced at trial. While it is true that an approximation of damages can be 
presented at trial, plaintiff presented N O quantitative evidence of damages. Although 
plaintiff insists that she presented actual damages at trial, the only testimony at trial regarding 
damages was that plaintiffs treatment was reasonable and that future treatment would be 
similar to past treatment. No evidence of cost, duration or frequency of past or future 
treatment was presented. Schindler's alleged knowledge or notice of damages, the jury's 
beliefs as to the damages being presented, or the fact that documents regarding damages were 
allegedly provided to Schindler prior to trial cannot substitute for plaintiff presenting 
evidence of damages at trial. 
Even if plaintiffs Summary were properly admitted into evidence, plaintiff 
nonetheless failed to establish her damages because the summary was inconsistent with the 
medical records and the documents supporting the figures on the summary were not 
provided as required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 1006. 
The purpose of the availability requirement of [Rule] 1006 is to give the 
opposing party an opportunity to verify the reliability and accuracy of the 
summary and prepare for cross-examination of the material prior to trial. 
Where a party fails to make materials underlying a summary exhibit available, 
that exhibit is inadmissible. [Rule] 1006 operates independently of the 
discovery rules, and the failure to request or obtain the documents during 
discovery does not negate a party's absolute right to subsequent production of 
material under Rule 1006, should that material become incorporated in a chart, 
summary, or calculation. 
Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto, Ins, Co., 2000 Ida. LEXIS 144 *20 (Idaho Dec. 28, 2000). 
Even where a party claims that all information underlying and supporting the summary was 
produced to the opposing party, such production is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements 
of Rule 1006. A party using a summary at trial is required to provide "all the data necessary 
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to understand the . . . summary." Id. at *22. Based on the purpose of Rule 1006, the party 
must produce, in their entirety, all documents from which the summarized information was 
extracted so the opposing party may determine the source and understand how the summary 
was prepared. See id. at *23. If a summary of damages is not properly supported with 
foundation under Rule 1006 and does not sufficiently identify the matters upon which the 
summary is based, the summary is inadmissible. Howard v. General Electric Co., 1991 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 4467 *10 (Ohio Ct App. Sept. 16,1991).. 
Although plaintiff asserts that invoices and other documents were made available to 
Schindler during the course of this litigation, no such production was made in response to 
Schindler's objection and neither Schindler nor the trial court had an opportunity to verify 
that the figures on plaintiffs summary were accurate. Such disclosure is particularly 
important here since the figures on the summary were not consistent with any medical 
records in Schindler's possession. Schindler properly objected to the admission of the 
summary before trial. R. 0482-83. During closing argument, Schindler repeated its objection 
to plaintiffs Summary because there was no way for Schindler to know the source or 
accuracy of the figures on the summary. R. 911 at 659. Finally, even the figures on plaintiffs 
summary exhibit were not consistent with the hand-written summary offered by counsel in 
closing argument regarding damages.8 
III. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Plaintiff first argues that Schindler failed to marshall the evidence in challenging the 
For example, counsel argued that plaintiff needed four medications in the future, two of 
which appeared in no medical record or on plaintiffs Summary of Past Medical Expenses. 
Plaintiff fails to even address this issue, and others, raised by Schindler. App. Brief at 42-43. 
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ruling of the district court. Brief of Appellee at 36. Even a cursory review of Schindler's 
opening brief, however, shows that Schindler, in great detail, marshaled the evidence 
presented at trial. In over 18 pages and eighty paragraphs, Schindler marshalled all of the 
evidence presented at trial, setting forth the testimony of each witness regarding each injury 
or subject to which that person testified and all testimony relevant to the issue of damages. 
Plaintiff also asserts that Schindler failed to show "substantial" or "prejudicial" error 
necessitating a new trial. Brief of Appellee at 36. A large award of damages in this case 
where plaintiff failed to prove causation or damages certainly rises to the level of substantial 
and prejudicial error. 
A. BPPV. 
Plaintiff summarily concludes, without any legal citation or argument, that Dr. 
Morgan's expert testimony was admissible and that his testimony, along with Dr. Siddoway's 
testimony, was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. Brief of Appellee at 37. 
Plaintiff fails to acknowledge, however, that Dr. Siddoway, as a treating physician could not 
testify as to legal causation based on the court's ruling prior to trial. 
Although there was extensive testimony regarding plaintiffs BPPV presented at trial, 
none of that testimony established the cause of the BPPV. The jury verdict awarding 
plaintiff damages for that condition was therefore not supported by the evidence. 
B. Pre-Existing Condition. 
Plaintiff admits that she never made a claim for aggravation of a pre-existing injury 
and did not argue that claim at trial. Plaintiff inexplicably asserts that because Schindler 
asserted that the claimed BPPV condition was pre-existing, the trial court properly instructed 
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the jury on that issue. Schindler did not, as plaintiff suggests, argue at trial that plaintiffs pre-
existing injury was aggravated. Rather, Schindler argued that her injuries pre-existed and 
therefore could not have been caused by the fall. The court should have instructed the jury 
on plaintiffs claims—which admittedly did not include aggravation of a pre-existing injury. 
C. Opening and Closing Arguments. 
Plaintiff incorrectly argues that Schindler objected to only two statements during 
opening and closing arguments. During opening, Schindler objected several times to 
counsel's improper statements, including those alluding to the wealth of Schindler's expert. 
R. 908 at p. 49. In addition, Schindler made a general objection to plaintiffs entire opening 
statement, arguing that counsel was outside the bounds of proper subject matter for opening 
and indicating that Schindler was attempting not to interrupt counsel or be rude with 
continual objections. See id. During closing arguments, Schindler similarly objected 
repeatedly to counsel's improper comments. R. 911 at 708, 709, 711, 713, 716. 
Plaintiff acknowledges that Utah law does not require that counsel object to each and 
every improper statement made in opening and closing argument where such conduct 
constitutes plain error or where the fundamental fairness of the trial is compromised. Brief 
of Appellee at 42, 44. Courts from other jurisdictions agree in holding that counsel is not 
required to object to every objectionable comment to preserve the objections for appeal. 
For reversible error to be found in closing argument, the challenged argument 
must be plainly unwarranted and clearly injurious. The failure to make a 
contemporaneous objection to argument claimed to be improper . . . does not 
forfeit the ability to seek a new trial on the basis of improper closing argument 
where the interest of substantial justice is at stake. The standard for 
determining whether a jury verdict should be set aside as a result of misconduct 
of counsel is whether the conduct was such as to impair gravely the calm and 
dispassionate consideration of the case by the jury. 
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Rosa P. City of Fori Myers, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10427 *6-8 (D. Fl. Feb. 12, 2008) (citations 
and quotations omitted). Objection to every improper statement in opening or closing is not 
required where counsel "grossly and persistendy abuses his privilege." Hodoromki v. Rayfield, 
1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 3210 *7-8 (Ohio Ct. App. July 24, 1997). 
Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that Schindler "strings" plaintiffs counsel's improper 
statements together to create some "illusion" about the remarks. To the contrary, Schindler 
quotes counsel's inappropriate comments in the order stated at trial, leaving out the 
remainder of the opening and closing arguments not relevant to Schindler's argument.9 
Plaintiff continues to belabor Schindler's allegedly "unreasonable," "belittling," 
"dictatorial," "overbearing," and "condescending," behavior at trial. Plaintiff, however, never 
once objected to any such conduct, nor is there any basis for such claims. Schindler 
conducted the examination of plaintiff and plaintiffs witnesses in a calm and professional 
manner, reviewing each relevant medical record and eliciting appropriate testimony. It is no 
surprise that plaintiff cites to no specific instances of any such conduct in the record. 
While plaintiffs counsel acknowledges generally that he made improper statements 
during opening and closing, plaintiff ignores most of the instances cited by Schindler and 
addresses only two instances of counsel's comments during opening and closing arguments: 
1) statements regarding Schindler's stipulation of liability; and 2) counsel's statements that he 
"knows Connie." As set forth in five, single-spaced pages of Schindler's opening brief, 
counsel repeatedly made dozens of inappropriate comments during opening and closing such 
9
 The only other way Schindler could have presented counsel's repeated improper comments 
would be to recite the entire transcript of opening and closing. The Court has in the record 
the entire transcript for its review. 
that those statements, "taken as a whole and in context, . . . rose to the level of invoking 
passion and prejudice of the jury." R. 0853 (trial court's ruling). 
As to Schindler's stipulation to liability, plaintiff argues there was no agreement that 
the stipulation would not be mentioned. To the contrary, such an agreement was reached by 
the parties and the trial court cited to that agreement in ruling that it was improper for 
plaintiffs counsel to disclose that stipulation to the jury. R. 908 p. 15. 
Plaintiff attempts to downplay and justify counsel's vouching for her credibility by 
asserting that his statements were made in response to Schindler's "attacks" and 
"accusations" regarding her heart condition.10 If counsel intended to prove plaintiffs 
credibility he could have done so through evidence admitted at trial. It was improper, 
however for him to vouch for his client's credibility.11 Moreover, unfounded attacks on 
Schindler and its counsel do nothing to prove plaintiffs credibility. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the forgoing reasons and those previously set forth in Appellant's opening 
Brief Schindler respectfully requests that the Court set aside the verdict below and direct the 
entry of judgment in favor of Schindler. 
DATED this 7 ~day of March, 2010. 
VANCOTT,^A6LEY, CORNWALL & ^tCARTHY 
By: 
Scott M. Lilja 
10
 In fact, Schindler made no comments regarding plaintiffs heart condition, except to read 
the conclusions reached by plaintiffs treating physicians from her medical records. 
Counsel's vouching for his client's credibility was not an isolated comment; it was one of 
dozens made by counsel, the cumulative effect of which was highly prejudicial. 
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